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Abstract
This paper analyses the causal effects of weaker dismissal protection on the
incidence of long-term sickness (> six weeks). We exploit a German policy
change, which shifted the threshold exempting small establishments from dis-
missal protection from five to ten workers. Using administrative data, we find
a significantly negative reform effect on transitions into long-term sickness in
the second year after a worker has entered an establishment. This response
is due to a behavioural, rather than a compositional effect and is particularly
pronounced among medium-skilled males. Our results further indicate that
the reform did not alter the probability of involuntary unemployment after
sickness.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, the relevance of long-term sickness has increased substantially in Germany.
In 2018, about 42 per cent of all absence days were due to cases of long-term sickness of
more than six weeks (Meyer et al., 2019), compared with only about 36 per cent in 2001
(Gesundheitsreport BKK, 2004). Long-term sickness in particular represents a consider-
able burden for both affected employers and employees: For establishments, a worker’s
long-term sickness absence can lead to productivity losses, lower competitiveness and a
higher burden on healthy employees (Alavania et al., 2009; van den Heuvel et al., 2010).
This burden can be particularly severe for small establishments which usually struggle
more to compensate an employee’s absence. For the affected individuals, long-term sick-
ness - in addition to the burden of the sickness itself - may be accompanied by a loss of
income, depreciation of human capital and higher risk of dismissal and involuntary un-
employment (Chadi and Goerke, 2018). Studies show that the incidence and duration
of sickness correlate positively with the risk of unemployment (Hultin et al., 2012). This
effect remains even after controlling for the individuals’ health status. Accordingly, Hultin
et al. 2012 conclude that “long-term sick leave may start a process of marginalization from
the labor market” (p. 6).
In many OECD countries, social policy institutions aim at reducing those risks for
employees by providing an income replacement (in form of sick pay) and job security
(in form of dismissal protection). At the same time, the extent of institutional coverage
itself may, in turn, affect the sickness behaviour of workers, such as absenteeism (staying
away from work without being sick) or presenteeism (attending work while being sick):
On the one hand, moral hazard may play a role for those who are subject to strong
institutional protection (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Ziebarth, 2013; Scoppa, 2010). On
the other hand, those who are only weakly protected may try to avoid or shorten long
absences because they fear a loss of income or dismissal (Reichert et al., 2013). While
some studies have already focussed on long-term sickness absence in the context of sick
pay (e. g. Ziebarth, 2013), the effect of dismissal protection on long-term sickness absence
is still underexplored.
The present paper attempts to fill this gap and analyses the effects of dismissal pro-
tection on the incidence of long-term sickness absence along with its employment conse-
quences in Germany.1 Germany is a particularly interesting case as it is characterised
by fairly strict employment protection and, at the same time, by quite generous sick pay
regulations. Almost all employees are subject to the general protection against dismissal
laid down in the Protection Against Dismissal Act (PADA). However, German legislation
1There is no official definition of long-term sickness. This study focuses on spells of more than six
weeks according to the definition of the health insurances: The latter use the eligibility for sick pay as a
threshold to distinguish between short- and long-term illnesses (see for example Meyer et al., 2018, 2015;
Knieps and Pfaff, 2015).
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exempts small establishments below a certain threshold size of employees from dismissal
protection. In the course of the German Hartz reforms in 2004, the threshold for estab-
lishments being exempted from dismissal protection was raised from five to ten full-time
equivalent employees. Using this policy change as a natural experiment, we estimate the
causal effect of dismissal protection on long-term sickness periods and its employment con-
sequences at the individual level. To do so, we apply a difference-in-differences approach
to quantify the effect of the exemption. We conduct these analyses by exploiting a unique
administrative data set – BASiD – that combines data from the German Pension Register
and the Federal Employment Agency. The data set allows us to retrieve information on
both employment spells and long-term illness periods of German employees who have at
least one entry in their social security records. In addition, we can merge administra-
tive establishment information to this data set that enables us to perform a quite precise
calculation of establishment size. To better understand the underlying behavioural mech-
anisms (such as absenteeism or presenteeism), we further rationalize our findings using
complementary individual survey data.
Thus far, very few studies have addressed the impact of dismissal protection on sickness
absence in a quasi-experimental setting, as our study does. The only studies we are aware
of are analyses using policy changes in Sweden and Italy. The studies by Olsson (2009)
and Lindbeck et al. (2006) exploit a policy reform in Sweden in 2001 that enabled small
firms to exempt two workers from a seniority rule in case of redundancies. While Lindbeck
et al. (2006) focus on the reform’s effect on long-term illness spells, Olsson (2009) takes
all types of illness spells into consideration. Both studies provide evidence for a significant
reduction in sickness absence in firms that were affected by the policy change. Scoppa
(2010) analyses the 1990 policy reform in Italy that raised employment protection for
workers in small firms – albeit not to the same level of protection as in larger firms. After
the reform small firms could choose between the re-employment of affected workers or the
payment of a financial compensation, if a dismissal was judged unfair. Overall, the results
of this study point to a significant increase in sickness absence in affected firms.
In exploring the impact of employment protection legislation on the incidence of un-
employment after a long-term illness spell, our analysis is also related to a small num-
ber of studies that address the relationship between sickness absence and subsequent
(un)employment. Based on register data, Hesselius (2007) and Scoppa and Vuri (2014)
document a positive relationship between sickness absence and subsequent unemployment
spells for Sweden and Italy, respectively. Using Norwegian register data, Markussen (2012)
adopts an IV approach and finds that absence causes a reduction in the probability of
subsequent employment. Using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, Chadi and
Goerke (2018) focus on short-term sick leave as the authors exclude individuals who ex-
perienced at least one long-term illness episode per annum (more than six weeks). While
the authors document a significant positive association between short-term illness spells
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and the probability of being dismissed, their IV analysis does not provide evidence for any
causal effect of sickness absence on subsequent dismissals.
We contribute to the existing literature in three ways: First, our analysis exploits a re-
form that involved a more encompassing change in dismissal costs for small establishments
(employing more than five and up to ten employees). Other than in Sweden, the German
reform, by relaxing employment protection regulations for small establishments, not only
affected dismissals due to redundancies, but also dismissals that are caused by any other
reasons. Most importantly, the policy change also covers dismissals due to personal inca-
pability, a reason that is especially relevant in the context of absence behaviour. Moreover,
compared to the Italian case, small establishments in the affected size class did not enjoy
any exemptions from the PADA prior to the reform. As a result, the reform involved a
more pronounced decline in dismissal costs as compared to the increase in dismissal costs
in the Italian case.
Second, we focus on the effects of dismissal protection on long-term sickness absence
along with its employment consequences. Some empirical studies analyse the effects of
employment protection on the incidence of short-term sickness absence (see the studies
cited earlier as well as Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Jacob, 2013; Riphahn and Thalmaier,
2001). To the best of our knowledge, the study by Lindbeck et al. (2006) is the only one
explicitly addressing long-term sickness periods. However, there is barely any research on
the employment consequences of changes in dismissal protection among those who have
fallen long-term sick. Given that long-term sickness entails high risks for individuals,
employers and society, this research gap is notable.
Third, we estimate the effects of dismissal protection at the individual level. Most of
the previous studies consider aggregate absence and job flow rates at the establishment
level (e. g. Bauernschuster, 2013; Bauer et al., 2007; Boeri and Jimeno, 2005; Olsson,
2009; Lindbeck et al., 2006). With our analysis based on individual data, we explicitly
identify the group of individuals who were affected by the reform. A grandfathering clause
implied that the policy change was confined to workers who were hired by the affected
establishments after the reform. By tracking the illness histories of individuals who were
affected by the policy change, we are able to address the question whether a change in
employment protection impacts on particular groups of workers, for example those who
are believed to have the lowest productivity. Finally, by exploiting precise information on
individuals’ long-term illness histories, we are able to explicitly account for the selection of
workers with different illness histories into establishments that were subject to the reform.
Doing so is especially important in our context, as the restriction of the policy change to
newly hired workers might lead to a change in sickness absence that merely arises from
a different selection of workers into establishments. In general, the direction of such a
selection bias is not clear a-priori (see also Lindbeck et al., 2006; Olsson, 2009). On the
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one hand, individuals with a high propensity of being long-term sick might systematically
select themselves into establishments with stricter employment protection. On the other
hand, employers subject to the less strict employment protection regulations might become
more willing to hire employees with less favourable illness histories.
Previewing our preliminary results, we find that a reduction of dismissal protection
leads to a lower probability of long-term sickness absence in the second year after a worker
has entered an establishment. For low-skilled workers, we see this impact already in the
first year after entry. Our results provide no evidence of a reform effect on the duration
of long-term sickness absence, though. Contrary to our theoretical predictions, we cannot
detect any significant reform-related changes in the probability of becoming involuntarily
unemployed after sickness. In line with previous work, which fails to detect any major
effects of dismissal protection on separations at the establishment level, the reform does not
appear to be associated with a higher risk of dismissal among the particularly vulnerable
subgroup of ill workers. Overall, our findings suggest that it is less the establishments than
the employees themselves who react to changes in dismissal protection regulations. As to
the behavioural mechanisms, our complementary analyses based on survey data provide
no clear evidence of whether the results reflect an increase in presenteeism or a decline
in absenteeism. The conclusion to be drawn from this empirical exercise is that neither
mechanism can be excluded as an explanation.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: In section 2, we give an overview
of the theoretical and empirical literature regarding long-term sickness absence. Section 3
illustrates the German institutional setting before section 4 presents the data set and the
empirical strategy. Section 5 and 6 provide the empirical results and section 7 concludes.
2 Theoretical and Empirical Literature
When deriving hypotheses about the relationship between dismissal protection and the
incidence of sickness absence, we premise that individuals have to a certain degree some
discretion over their sickness behaviour in the form of absenteeism (staying away from
work without being sick2) or presenteeism (attending work while being sick).3 To the
extent that individuals may vary their sickness behaviour, they are likely to assess the
2Note that there is no uniform definition of absenteeism. In a broader sense, absenteeism is defined as
not showing up at work for whatever reason (Hirsch et al., 2017). “True” sickness-related absence times
are included here. In a narrower sense, absenteeism is defined as absence from work for reasons other than
sickness, often referred to as “shirking” (Brown and Sessions, 2004). In this study, we refer to the latter
definition.
3Empirical studies provide extensive evidence for the prevalence of both types of sickness behaviour,
absenteeism and presenteeism. For evidence of absenteeism see e. g. Frick and Malo (2008); Riphahn and
Thalmaier (2001); Chatterji and Tilley (2002), of presenteeism see e. g. Reichert et al. (2013); Hirsch et al.
(2017); Arnold (2016); Arnold and de Pinto (2015).
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benefits and costs of absence periods. In certain situations, the benefits of absence may
be high. This is, for example, the case when recovering from an illness is necessary or,
in case of moral hazard, if the disutility from work is large, e.g. due to unfavourable
working conditions (Hirsch et al., 2017; Brown and Sessions, 1996; Barmby et al., 1994).
However, the costs of absence may also be large, if, for example, the (duration of the)
absence period raises the probability of dismissal or is accompanied by a loss of income.4
Therefore, when deciding about absence, a worker trades off his or her utility of absence
against the financial and employment-related risks (Arnold and de Pinto, 2015).
The institutional context, in particular sick pay and dismissal protection regulations,
may play a crucial role for an employee’s decision to stay absent or not. The expected costs
of absence rise (i) with a lower income replacement level in the case of sickness (Brown
and Sessions, 2004; Ziebarth and Karlsson, 2014, 2010; Chatterji and Tilley, 2002; Pichler
and Ziebarth, 2017; Puhani and Sonderhof, 2010) and (ii) with a decreasing strictness of
employment protection regulations (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005; Brown and Sessions, 2004;
Olsson, 2009; Lindbeck et al., 2006; Scoppa, 2010). Thus, due to higher anticipated costs
of absence, individuals without or with only weak institutional protection may exhibit less
frequent and shorter absence periods compared to individuals who are strongly protected
by social policy institutions. As spelled out earlier, the studies by Olsson (2009) and
Lindbeck et al. (2006) support this hypothesis, by providing evidence for a significant
negative impact of weaker dismissal protection regulations on sickness absence rates. The
results by Scoppa (2010) show that stricter dismissal protection affects sickness absence
positively. Altogether, Olsson (2009) concludes “that employment protection is a decisive
force for sickness absence behavior” (p. 214).5
In addition to its impact on sickness absence, employment protection legislation may
affect the incidence of unemployment after a long-term sickness spell. Employees with long
sickness-related employment interruptions may signal a lower productivity, and, in case
of absenteeism, a lower motivation compared to workers who are continuously present
at work. Employers may therefore have the incentive to dismiss those employees who
4For example, Hirsch et al. (2017) show that in a model with perfect information, where workers
choose their optimal effort level, a higher probability of being dismissed increases workers’ effort level
or workplace attendance. However, once one allows for worker heterogeneity and imperfect information
about workers’ disutility of work, firms set wages to incentivize the average worker in the population.
This results in too high incentives for workers with a high disutility of work and too low incentives for
workers with a low disutility of work, resulting in absenteeism for the latter group. For low disutility
workers, an increase in the probability of being dismissed raises the gap between optimal wages and wages
under imperfect information, such that absenteeism for low disutility workers may even increase with the
dismissal probability.
5In addition to this strand of literature, there are also studies that look at the role of other institutions
and perceived job security for both types of sickness behaviour. For example, Ichino and Riphahn (2005)
explore the relationship between probation periods and sickness absence, using data from an Italian bank.
The authors show that absence times increase once the probation period, after which employees become
subject to dismissal protection, was completed. On the other hand, Hansen and Andersen (2008) show
that a higher extent of perceived job insecurity is associated with higher levels of presence despite sickness.
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are believed to have the lowest productivity. Due to the strict employment protection
regulations in Germany laid down in the PADA, dismissals of long-term sick workers are
substantially less costly for employers who are not subject to the PADA. Thus, one may
expect the risk of subsequent unemployment to rise with a less strict dismissal protection.
3 The German Institutional Background
3.1 Sick Pay Regulation
In Germany, if an employee falls sick, he or she needs to hand in a medical certificate
no later than the fourth day of absence.6 During the first six weeks of an illness episode
employees are entitled to short-term sickness pay, to be paid by the employer.7 The
maximum mandatory duration of sick pay may also derive from accumulating several
shorter illness spells within the last twelve months, as long as these are caused by the
same disease diagnosis. During this mandatory period of up to six weeks the employer is
obliged to provide short-term sick pay, which amounts to a replacement ratio of 100 per
cent of individuals’ earnings.
After six weeks of illness with the same disease diagnosis, employees are entitled to long-
term sick pay provided by the statutory health insurance. The latter covers the majority
(about 90 per cent) of the German population and is mandatory for all employees subject
to social security contributions whose earnings fall short of the contribution limit of the
statutory health insurance.8 The replacement level for persons receiving long-term sick
pay by the statutory health insurance is stipulated in the German Social Code. Since the
last reform in 1997, long-term sickness pay has amounted to a replacement ratio of 70 per
cent of gross earnings up to the (health insurance) social security contribution limit.9
In general, long-term sick pay regulations in Germany pursue the overall aim to sustain
the long-term employability of individuals who are still in the labour force. Thus, unlike
disability insurance schemes, long-term sick pay offers no possibility to permanently with-
draw from the labour market. The non-permanent character of sick pay not only reflects
6This statutory time limit is stipulated in the German Continued Remuneration Act (Entgelt-
fortzahlungsgesetz ). Note that the time limit for notification defines a maximum period as the law permits
employers to require a medical certificate already starting from the first day of illness.
7An exception concerns illness during the first four weeks after entering a new employer. During this
period employers are not obliged to provide sick pay, such that employees receive sick pay from their health
insurance.
8Civil servants and self-employed are in general exempted from social security contributions. Civil
servants and the self-employed as well as employees subject to to social security contributions whose
earnings exceed that threshold and self-employed individuals may choose between the statutory health
insurance or a private health insurance. Under the latter, employees stipulate the level of their long-term
sick pay individually.
9Prior to the 1997 reform, the replacement ratio was 80 per cent.
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itself in a limited entitlement duration10, but in two additional salient features of sick
pay regulations. First, individuals receiving long-term sick pay may be monitored by the
health insurance’s auditing system. The medical service run by the statutory health in-
surance is entitled to audit individuals’ sickness absence, if the statutory health insurance
expresses profound suspicions about any potential abuse of the sick pay system. Such
audits may be performed either based on an assessment of the documentation provided
by the medical doctor who ascertained the individual’s inability to work, or based on a
personal assessment of the individual’s ability to work by the service’s medical staff (see
Gürtzgen and Hank, 2018).11 Second, individuals who experienced a long-term illness
episode are generally entitled to conclude a reintegration agreement with their employer
with the general objective of a (possibly stepwise) reintegration into their former job.
3.2 Dismissal Protection Regulation
Compared to other Western countries, dismissal protection regulations in Germany are
quite strict (OECD, 2004). General protection against unfair dismissals (allgemeiner
Kündigungsschutz ) is provided by the Protection against Dismissal Act (PADA). The
PADA applies to all workers with a tenure of more than six months, who are employed
by an establishment with a certain minimum number of employees (currently ten fulltime
equivalent employees).12 Establishments operating below the stipulated threshold size
may dismiss any worker as long as the less restrictive requirements of the German Civil
Code (Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch) are met.
According to the more stringent employment protection provisions of the PADA, dis-
missals are justified in three cases only: first, in case of personal misconduct, second, as
a result of the operational requirements of the employer, and, third, in case of personal
incapability. While the judgement of individuals’ (in)capability is often based on their
absence times such as long-term illness episodes (e. g. Nott, 2016), just dismissals on the
grounds of illness require some conditions, such as a negative long-term health prognosis,
to be met.13 For employers, such a justification is associated with costs.
Moreover, establishments are typically required to inform the works council about a
dismissal, if such a worker representation exists. Consultation with the works council is
mandatory for both individual and collective redundancies. The latter generally require
the negotiation of a ’social plan’ with the works council. Such a plan may, for example,
10The maximum duration of long-term sick pay for the same disease is 78 weeks within a period of three
years.
11In about three out of hundred cases of individuals’ inability to work, the statutory health insurance
commissions the medical service to provide a socio-medical audit (Medizinischer Dienst der Krankenver-
sicherung, 2018).
12Establishments engaged in shipping and aircraft transportation are exempted from the PADA, as they
are subject to a specific legislation.
13Note that this is different from regulations in other countries, such as Norway, where individuals enjoy
a special dismissal protection while being long-term sick (Fevang et al., 2014).
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stipulate severance payments and the selection of employees who are laid off. Severance
payments may also result from settlements after individual dismissals out of or at the
Labour Court - either because employers are not able to prove that the requirements for
a legal dismissal are met or because they want to prevent workers from suing them at
Court. Overall, these considerations highlight that any dismissal subject to the PADA –
either due to insecurity about which dismissals are considered just or due to sanctions or
severance payments – is likely to be much more costly than a comparable dismissal outside
the scope of the PADA.
Key to our analysis is that the PADA only applies to establishments exceeding a
stipulated establishment size. Over the last decades, the threshold for applicability has
changed several times, from five to ten fulltime equivalent employees (FTEs) in October
1996, back to five FTEs in January 1999 and then in the course of the Hartz reforms back
again to ten FTEs in January 2004. For the latter reform, it is important to note that
those workers who were already employed in affected establishments (normally) did not
lose their protection.14
To calculate the number of FTEs for the applicability threshold, individuals working
fulltime, i. e. more than 30 hours per week, are counted as one worker, whereas individuals
working less than 30 hours are weighted by a factor of 0.5 (under 20 hours) and 0.75
(between 20 and 30 hours), respectively.15 Some groups of workers, such as apprentices,
family members without a labour contract or freelance collaborators are not counted when
calculating the PADA relevant establishment size. The threshold for applicability of the
PADA is typically not based upon the establishment size at a certain point in time,
but is rather derived from the number of workers who are ’normally’ employed by an
establishment. Thus, to compute the threshold, both past and future developments of the
workforce need to be taken into account.
With regard to anticipation effects, the former Chancellor Gerhard Schröder announced
a general reform of employment protection in a government declaration in March 2003.
However, the change of the threshold from five to ten FTEs was not part of this declaration.
The final dismissal protection reform along with the stipulation of the threshold and the
details of its calculation was not approved until December 23, 2003, just shortly before
the reform came into effect (on January 1st, 2004). This suggests that neither the affected
employees nor the affected establishments could anticipate the exact details of the reform
and change their behaviour accordingly (Bauernschuster, 2013; Hassel and Schiller, 2010).
14Under some circumstances, even individuals employed in affected establishments before 2004 may lose
their dismissal protection. This may occur when the number of incumbent employees (workers already
employed before 2004) falls below the threshold that determined applicability of the PADA until 2004 (five
FTEs).
15The weighting procedure described here has applied since the 1999 reform of the PADA; prior to that
reform, employees who worked less than 10 hours were weighted by the factor 0.25 (see also Boockmann
et al., 2008).
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We therefore can largely rule out anticipatory effects and a so-called “Ashenfelter’s dip”
(Ashenfelter, 1978) in our analyses.
4 Empirical Strategy, Data and Variables
4.1 Empirical Strategy
To estimate the causal effect of dismissal protection on our outcome variables, we exploit
the reform of dismissal protection in 2004 as a natural experiment. As pointed out in
section 3.2, this reform raised the threshold below which establishments are exempted
from dismissal protection from five to ten full-time equivalent workers. Due to transitory
regulations that (normally) guaranteed dismissal protection to those who were already
employed in an establishment before 2004, the reform affected only employees entering an
establishment with more than five to ten FTE workers. We define this group of workers
as our treatment group and compare their outcomes of interest to those of a control group
comprised of individuals entering an establishment slightly above the threshold, that is
with more than ten to 20 FTE workers. An “establishment entry” is defined as the first
employment spell subject to social insurance contributions in an establishment of the
relevant size class within the time period 1 January 2001 and 30 June 2003 or within 1
January 2004 and 30 June 2006, respectively.16 As we observe the treatment and control
group before and after the reform, we are able to apply a difference-in-differences approach,
by comparing the differences in our outcomes of interest across both groups before and
after the reform. The identifying assumption of this approach requires that time trends be
the same for both treatment and control group in the absence of the treatment (Blundell
and Costa Dias, 2009; Angrist and Pischke, 2009). Further, the SUTVA assumption
states that the treatment of one individual must not influence other individuals’ potential
outcomes (and vice versa) (Rubin, 1980).
Moreover, the definition of the groups implies that the group composition may change
over time as it is rather unlikely to track the same individual before and after the reform.
For this reason, we need to control for differences in relevant observable characteristics
across both groups before and after the reform. In doing so, we take into account, among
other things, individuals’ previous sickness and employment histories. While we still have
to assume that there are no unobservable characteristics affecting the group composition
after the reform, this procedure enables us to account for a potential selection on individ-
uals’ observable health status into establishments that were either affected or not affected
by the reform.
Under these assumptions, we estimate the average treatment effect on the treated
16For more details on the definition of “establishment entry” see also Table A.5 in the Appendix.
9
(ATT) in a linear regression framework using the following equation:
Yi = α+ βTi + γGi + τDID(Ti ∗Gi) + ηXi + εi (1)
In eq. (1), the DiD estimator τDID is given by the coefficient on the interaction term of
the group dummy Gi (indicating whether an individual belongs to the treatment or control
group) and the time dummy Ti (indicating whether an individual is observed before or after
the reform). Yi is the outcome variable, i. e. the incidence and duration of sickness periods
and the risk of becoming involuntarily unemployed after sickness. β accounts for common
time effects, γ captures the group effects and εi reflects the error term. Additionally, we
add a vector of control variables Xi capturing observable individual and establishment
characteristics. Further, in case of correlated errors within establishments, default robust
standard errors would overstate the precision of the estimation (Cameron and Miller, 2015)
and we therefore display standard errors adjusted for clustering at the establishment level.
To rule out that establishments might have self-selected themselves into the different
size classes, we have to check whether there are any “threshold effects” with regard to
changes in the establishment size distribution. Because of the threshold regulation, small
establishments may have had the incentive to stay below the threshold value of five FTE
workers before the reform. After the reform, they may have expanded up to the new
threshold size of 10 FTE workers without being affected by the PADA (see also Priesack,
2015). To test for such threshold effects, we calculate the annual share of establishments by
FTE size categories between 1999 and 2010 using data of the Establishment History Panel
(BHP). This cross-sectional data set contains all establishments in Germany with at least
one employee liable to social security on the yearly reference date June 30th (Schmucker
et al., 2018). Figure 1 shows that, overall, the distribution of establishments according
to FTE size categories remained broadly unaltered over the observation period suggesting
that threshold effects do not play a major role.
4.2 Data
Our empirical analysis is based on longitudinal German register data (BASiD). The data
combine information from the German Pension Register with data from the German Fed-
eral Employment Agency. The BASiD data set is a stratified random one-percent sample
of all individuals from the early 1940s to the early 1990s birth cohorts, who have at least
one entry in their social security records and who have not retired yet (for details see
Hochfellner et al., 2012). The data provide longitudinal information on individuals’ en-
tire pension relevant biographies up to the year 2007. Individual work histories cover the
period from the year individuals were aged 14 until the age of 67. In Germany, statutory
pension insurance is mandatory for all employees in the private and public sector, thus only
excluding civil servants and self-employed individuals. As a consequence, the insurance
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Figure 1: Establishment distribution by FTE size categories, 1999 to 2010
Note. The establishment size is calculated using the number of full-time-equivalent workers as stipulated in the
PADA (see also Section 3.2): Apprentices are excluded from the calculation; workers working fulltime are counted
as one worker; workers working in “mini-part-time” (< 18 hours) and workers in marginal employment are
weighted by the factor 0.5, workers working in “midi-part-time” (>= 18 hours) are weighted by the factor 0.75.
Source: Establishment History Panel (BHP) 1999-2010, own calculations.
covers more than 90 per cent of the entire population for whom all past pension-relevant
periods have been recorded.
The Pension Register provides information on all pension relevant periods, i.e. periods
for which contributions were paid (such as employment, long-term illness and unemploy-
ment) as well as periods without contributions, which were still creditable for the pension
insurance. The latter refers to activities for which an individual receives pension cred-
its. These are periods of school or university attendance after the age of 15, periods of
training and apprenticeship and periods of caring. Apart from individual information
on employment status, the Pension Register provides information on age, gender as well
as monthly earnings, which can be calculated by exploiting information on pension credit
points gained from social security employment. Table A.1 in the Appendix contains a more
detailed description of the individual characteristics provided by the Pension Register.
Starting from 1975 (in western Germany), employment spells subject to social secu-
rity contributions from the Pension Register can be merged with data from the German
Federal Employment Agency, the Integrated Labor Market Biographies and the Estab-
lishment History Panel. The Integrated Labor Market Biographies provide further time
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varying individual information on educational status (three categories) and an establish-
ment identifier17. The latter allows us to identify newly hired employees and enables us to
gain information on tenure at the current employer. Table A.3 in the Appendix provides a
more detailed description of the variables gained from the Employment Statistics Register.
4.3 Sample Selection and Descriptives
As spelled out earlier, we define workers entering an establishment of up to 10 FTE work-
ers as our treatment group, whereas the control group consists of individuals entering an
establishment slightly above the threshold, that is with more than ten to 20 FTE work-
ers. We carry out a somewhat more precise calculation of establishment size compared
to previous studies which use the number of workers - regardless of their working time -
on a particular set date. Unlike previous studies, we approximate the number of full-time
equivalent workers and take into account annual fluctuations of the workforce (for details
on how we calculated the establishment size see Table A.5 in the Appendix). Calculating
establishment size as precise as possible is crucial for correctly assigning individuals to
either the treatment or the control group in our difference-in-differences set-up. However,
we do not have sufficient information on individuals’ exact weekly working hours in our
data. Our calculation of the establishment size that is relevant for the applicability of
the PADA may therefore still suffer from some imprecisions. To allow for a certain mea-
surement error, we therefore exclude entries into establishments with a size close to the
threshold. Thus, we restrict our sample to individuals entering an establishment of 6-9
(treatment group) and 12-20 (control group) FTE employees, respectively. We further
ensure that the establishments remain in the same size group during the period a worker
is employed in this establishment. We also exclude entries into establishments of the ship-
ping or aircraft transportation sector as the PADA does not apply to these sectors (cf.
section 3.2).
Tables 1 and 2 display descriptive statistics of the treatment and control group in
the baseline sample before and after the reform. The figures show that there are some
systematic differences in the gender composition as well as the occupational and industry
structure across treated and control individuals before and after the reform. This high-
lights the importance of including these observables as controls into our regressions. The
differences in industry affiliation (and to some extent occupations) clearly reflect hetero-
geneous establishment size distributions across different industries. Note, however, that
17Note that the legal definition of “establishment” does not match exactly with the establishments
identified by the establishment identifier of the Establishment History Panel (on the definitions of “estab-
lishment” see Table A.4 in the Appendix). However, according to the establishment panel – a representative
survey of establishments in Germany – , a large majority of establishments is an independent company
without any other places of business (see Figure A.1 in the Appendix.). We can expect these establishments
to be covered by both the legal definition and the definition in the administrative data.
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there are no major differences concerning individuals’ employment and illness histories
across treated and control individuals.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics I
Pre-Reform
(1) Treatment Group (2) Control Group
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean (2)-(1)
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.445 0.497 0.416 0.493 -0.029 ***
Age 31.923 9.813 32.076 9.929 0.153
Age2 96.961 125.702 99.030 9.929
Foreign 0.261 0.439 0.271 0.444 0.009
Qualification
Low-Skilled 0.192 0.394 0.195 0.397 0.003
Medium-Skilled 0.720 0.449 0.705 0.456 -0.015 *
High-Skilled 0.088 0.284 0.100 0.300 0.012 **
Cum. Earnings (in 10,000 EUR) 11.367 14.495 11.998 15.776 0.631 **
Employment-Related Characteristics
Daily Wage 52.117 28.303 54.772 29.259 2.655 ***
Working Fulltime 0.835 0.371 0.844 0.363 0.009
Occupational Status
Bluecollar 0.497 0.500 0.500 0.500 0.003
Whitecollar 0.323 0.468 0.334 0.472 0.011
Others 0.179 0.383 0.166 0.372 -0.013 **
Occupational Activity
Agrar 0.028 0.166 0.025 0.156 -0.003
Craftsman 0.292 0.455 0.316 0.465 0.024 ***
Salary 0.082 0.274 0.091 0.287 0.009 *
Sale 0.119 0.323 0.099 0.299 -0.019 ***
Clerical 0.153 0.360 0.169 0.375 0.016 ***
Service 0.327 0.469 0.300 0.458 -0.027 ***
Establishment Characteristics
Location: West Germany 0.857 0.350 0.855 0.352 -0.002
Industry
Agrar/Fishery 0.030 0.170 0.023 0.150 -0.006 **
Energy/Mining 0.001 0.034 0.002 0.039 0.000
Manufacturing 0.086 0.280 0.116 0.320 0.030 ***
Construction 0.113 0.316 0.088 0.284 -0.025 ***
Wholesale 0.201 0.400 0.177 0.381 -0.024 ***
Traffic/Communication 0.073 0.260 0.074 0.262 0.001
Banking/Insurance 0.010 0.101 0.010 0.101 0.000
Other Services 0.278 0.448 0.311 0.463 0.033 ***
Public Administration 0.031 0.173 0.036 0.186 0.005 *
Public Sector 0.014 0.119 0.010 0.101 -0.004 **
Individual Employment and Sickness History
Cum. Sickness Duration 1.869 5.649 1.823 5.130 -0.046
Cum. Unemployment Duration 11.694 34.873 12.178 36.981 0.484
Cum. Employment Duration 97.939 101.785 99.945 107.715 2.006
Cum. Non-Employment Duration 34.044 54.511 33.291 52.220 -0.753
# of Establishment Changes 4.953 5.147 5.094 5.416 0.141
# of Sickness Spells 1.046 2.536 1.057 2.577 0.011
# of Unemployment Spells 1.854 2.319 1.896 2.414 0.042
# of Employment Spells 4.748 4.580 4.829 4.839 0.080
# of Non-Employment Spells 2.168 2.597 2.186 2.670 0.019
# of individuals in baseline sample 5,970 9,059
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics of relevant characteristics of the treatment and control group before the
reform. The treatment (control) group consists of employees working in establishments of 6-9 (12-20) FTE employees
who entered the establishment between 1.1.2001 and 30.6.2003. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance of the
difference in the mean between the treatment and control group at the 10%, 5% and 1% level (t-test). For the
definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix. All control variables
are measured at the date of entry into the establishment. All durations are measured in months. Source: BASiD,
own calculations.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics II
Post-Reform
(1) Treatment Group (2) Control Group
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean (2)-(1)
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.445 0.497 0.409 0.492 -0.037 ***
Age 33.008 9.909 32.925 9.949 -0.083
Age2 98.235 135.405 98.993 134.836
Foreign 0.259 0.438 0.248 0.432 -0.011
Qualification
Low-Skilled 0.156 0.363 0.161 0.368 0.005
Medium-Skilled 0.744 0.437 0.716 0.451 -0.028 ***
High-Skilled 0.100 0.301 0.123 0.328 0.022 ***
Cum. Earnings (in 10,000 EUR) 13.650 17.015 14.526 18.192 0.877 ***
Employment-Related Characteristics
Daily Wage 52.661 29.826 56.276 32.444 3.615 ***
Working Fulltime 0.839 0.367 0.837 0.369 -0.002
Occupational Status
Bluecollar 0.503 0.500 0.515 0.500 0.012
Whitecollar 0.326 0.469 0.313 0.464 -0.013
Others 0.171 0.376 0.172 0.377 0.001
Occupational Activity
Agrar 0.032 0.176 0.027 0.161 -0.005 *
Craftsman 0.299 0.458 0.313 0.464 0.014 *
Salary 0.085 0.278 0.102 0.302 0.017 ***
Sale 0.115 0.319 0.096 0.294 -0.020 ***
Clerical 0.154 0.361 0.166 0.372 0.011 *
Service 0.315 0.464 0.297 0.457 -0.017 **
Establishment Characteristics
Location: West Germany 0.852 0.356 0.853 0.354 0.002
Industry
Agrar/Fishery 0.033 0.179 0.026 0.159 -0.007 **
Energy/Mining 0.003 0.053 0.004 0.064 0.001
Manufacturing 0.088 0.284 0.114 0.317 0.025 ***
Construction 0.124 0.330 0.089 0.285 -0.035 ***
Wholesale 0.218 0.413 0.181 0.385 -0.038 ***
Traffic/Communication 0.064 0.245 0.079 0.269 0.014 ***
Banking/Insurance 0.012 0.111 0.012 0.109 0.000
Other Services 0.283 0.451 0.328 0.470 0.045 ***
Public Administration 0.117 0.321 0.117 0.322 0.000
Public Sector 0.056 0.231 0.050 0.218 -0.006
Individual Employment and Sickness History
Cum. Sickness Duration 1.931 5.431 1.972 5.761 0.041
Cum. Unemployment Duration 23.380 51.192 22.348 50.833 -1.031
Cum. Employment Duration 110.245 105.068 109.666 106.368 -0.579
Cum. Non-Employment Duration 34.292 52.265 32.937 50.920 -1.355
# of Establishment Changes 5.677 5.561 5.868 6.596 0.191 *
# of Sickness Spells 1.008 2.503 1.010 2.520 0.001
# of Unemployment Spells 2.235 2.665 2.232 2.671 -0.003
# of Employment Spells 4.994 4.993 5.025 5.116 0.031
# of Non-Employment Spells 2.150 2.602 2.138 2.744 -0.013
# of individuals in baseline sample 5,310 7,788
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics of relevant characteristics of the treatment and control group after the
reform. The treatment (control) group consists of employees working in establishments of 6-9 (12-20) FTE employees
who entered the establishment between 1.1.2004 and 30.6.2006. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance of the
difference in the mean between the treatment and control group at the 10%, 5% and 1% level (t-test). For the
definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix. All control variables
are measured at the date of entry into the establishment. All durations are measured in months. Source: BASiD,
own calculations.
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5 Estimation and Results
5.1 Incidence of Sickness
5.1.1 Descriptive Results
Figure 2 shows the cumulative incidence of sickness for the treatment and the control group
during the first two years after establishment entry. In the pre-reform period, the evolution
of this outcome exhibits no major differences across treated and control individuals. In
the post-reform period, the cumulative incidence of sickness is lower for both groups. The
graphs seem to diverge slightly across both groups, with the treatment group exhibiting a
larger decline in the cumulative incidence of sickness after the reform as compared to the
control group. The figures also show that the transition into a long-term sickness episode
is a rather rare event; only 4.6 per cent and 3.7 per cent of individuals in our baseline
sample experienced at least one transition into a long-term sickness episode during the
first 24 months after entry into the establishment before and after the reform, respectively.
Figure 2: Cumulative Incidence of Sickness
Note. The treatment (control) group consists of workers working in establishments of 6-9 (12-20) FTE employees
who entered the establishment three years before or three years after the reform. We calculate the share of workers
having at least one long-term-sickness period until the respective month after entry.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
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5.1.2 Regression Results
To estimate the reform’s effect on the incidence of (long-term) sickness in the short and
medium run, we look at the probability of experiencing a transition into sickness in the
first and in the second year after entering an establishment. For this, we have to ensure
that the individuals are ’at risk’ of experiencing such a transition. Thus, to calculate
the probability of a transition into sickness in the first year after entry, we exclude those
who were already ill at establishment entry resulting in a sample of 27,967 observations.18
Note that looking at the probability of a transition into sickness in the second year raises
selectivity issues, as this outcome can be derived only for those individuals with a sufficient
tenure at the new employer. This is also reflected in our sample size for the second year
outcome, which is reduced to a total of 8,845 observations.
Table 3 and Table 4 present the results of the multivariate analyses for outcomes in
the first and second year after establishment entry. We estimate four models, which are
stepwise augmented by different sets of explanatory variables.19 The first model is the
basic DiD-model without any controls. The second model includes individual charac-
teristics (gender, age, age squared, nationality, qualification, and cumulative earnings),
employment-related characteristics (the daily wage, working time, occupational status,
and occupational sector), as well as year dummies. The third model also includes estab-
lishment characteristics, in particular the location of the establishment (West vs. East
Germany) and ten industry dummies. Finally, the fourth model further adds information
on individuals’ employment and sickness histories, accounting for the duration and number
of previous long-term sickness episodes, employment, unemployment and non-employment
spells as well as the number of establishment changes.
Table 3 shows that the multivariate analyses do not provide any evidence of a reform
effect on the incidence of having experienced a long-term sickness episode in the first year
after entering the establishment. The coefficient on the interaction term is insignificantly
negative, but close to zero and remains unaltered after controlling for differences in ob-
servables. The coefficient on the group variable, Treat, is negative and insignificant. It
remains largely unchanged across all specifications, indicating that adding controls does
not affect the mean time-invariant difference between both groups. The coefficient on the
time variable, Post, is negative and significant, which is in line with the descriptive evolu-
tion of this outcome as shown in Figure 2. Moreover, the negative time effect increases in
magnitude after adding more control variables.
We now turn to the reform’s medium run effect, by exploring the effect on the probabil-
18160 individuals in our sample (0.6%) enter the establishment while being already ill. Most of these
workers fell sick shortly before entering the establishment and the duration of most of these sickness spells
is rather short.
19The estimates from the additional explanatory variables should not be interpreted as causal but
instead seen as controls for differences between the groups before and after the reform.
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Table 3: Regression Results Transition Into Sickness in the First Year After Entry
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Placebo
Post x Treat -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Post -0.007** -0.010** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.015***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Treat -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Female 0.008*** 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.007***
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002)
Age 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Age2 -0.000** -0.000** 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Foreign -0.013*** -0.009*** -0.004 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Qualification, Reference: Medium-Skilled
Low-Skilled -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.008*** -0.012***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
High-Skilled -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.007** -0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Cumulative Wages -0.000 0.000 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Daily Wage -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
White-Collar, Reference: Blue-Collar -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.015*** -0.019***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Occupational Activity, Reference: Craftsman
Agrar -0.000 0.007 0.008 -0.002
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Salary -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.011*** -0.013***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Sale -0.016*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.012**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Clerical -0.014*** -0.011** -0.008* -0.009**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Service -0.010*** -0.005 -0.004 -0.006
(0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Residence of Establishment: West Germany -0.028*** -0.015*** -0.018***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Cum. Sickness Duration 0.000 -0.001
(0.000) (0.005)
Cum. Unemployment Duration 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
Cum. Employment Duration -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000)
Cum. Nonemployment Duration 0.000* 0.000*
(0.000) (0.000)
# of Establishment Changes 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.000)
# of Sickness Spells 0.010*** 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001)
# of Unemployment Spells 0.002** 0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
# of Employment Spells -0.002** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001)
# of Non-Employment Spells -0.000 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Industry Dummies X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
Constant 0.039*** 0.071*** 0.082*** 0.058*** 0.073***
(0.002) (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008)
Observations 27,967 27,967 27,967 27,967 29,373
R2 0.000 0.013 0.017 0.030 0.034
Notes: The table shows results of a linear probability model estimating the probability of a transition into sickness
0 to 12 months after establishment entry; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The treatment (control) group consists of workers entering an establishment of
6-9 (12-20) FTE workers. All control variables are measured at the date of entry into the establishment. For the
definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. The placebo regression hypothetically
assumes the dismissal protection reform to take place in 2003.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
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ity of having experienced a long-term sickness spell in the second year after establishment
entry. Table 4 shows the results. According to the specification incorporating all control
variables, treated individuals exhibit a 1.3 percentage point lower incidence of (long-term)
sickness. This effect remains largely constant across all specification.20 Given that the
overall probability of having experienced a transition into sickness in the second year is 2.4
per cent, this effect is fairly large. The group effect is now positive, but still insignificant.
In contrast, the time effect is still negative and significant (except for the basic model)
and becomes larger in magnitude after adding more control variables. The last column
in Table 4 shows estimates from placebo regressions, which hypothetically assume that
the dismissal protection reform took place in 2003. The placebo estimates do not provide
any evidence of significant effects on our outcome both, for the first and the second year,
thereby supporting the parallel trend assumption.
Table 4: Regression Results Transition Into Sickness in the Second Year After Entry
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Placebo
Post x Treat -0.012* -0.014** -0.014** -0.013** -0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Post -0.002 -0.013** -0.013** -0.015** 0.015**
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Treat 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Individual Characteristics - X X X X
Employment-Related Characteristics - X X X X
Year Dummies - X X X X
Establishment Characteristics - - X X X
Individual Employment and Sickness History - - - X X
Constant 0.025*** 0.059*** 0.055*** 0.038*** 0.037***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.010) (0.012) (0.012)
Observations 8,845 8,845 8,845 8,845 9,188
R2 0.001 0.018 0.019 0.030 0.021
Notes: The table shows results of a linear probability model estimating the probability of a transition to sickness 13
to 24 months after establishment entry; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The treatment (control) group consists of workers entering an establishment
of 6-9 (12-20) FTE workers. All control variables are measured at the date of entry into the establishment. For
definition and calculation of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix. The placebo regression
hypothetically assumes the dismissal protection reform to take place in 2003.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
5.1.3 Robustness Checks
In this section, we explore whether the results from Table 4 are robust to several sensitivity
checks: First, we excluded illness spells lasting no longer than ten days, as these spells
may also result from leave periods due the sickness of a child. The health insurance covers
the loss of income in case of illness of an individual’s child as long as these days of sickness
do not exceed ten days per year. Therefore, we cannot infer from the data whether these
short sickness periods arise from individuals’ own sick days or from those of caring for their
ill children. Second, we explore whether our results are robust to using a different control
20We have also estimated probit models. The marginal effects remain largely unaltered in the non-linear
model specifications.
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group, in particular individuals working in establishments with 0.5 to 4 FTE employees.
The individuals of this control group were not subject to the PADA before and after the
reform. Third, we also included individuals entering establishments with a size close to the
threshold. The treatment group then consists of individuals entering establishments with
more than 5 and up to 10 FTE employees, whereas the control group consists of individuals
entering establishments with 11 to 20 FTE employees. The fourth and fifth robustness
checks are combinations of the previous checks. The results are shown in Table A.9 in
the Appendix: When excluding short illness spells (columns (1) and (4)), the effects are
slightly smaller in magnitude, but still significant at the 10 per cent level. This suggests
that part of the overall effect is also due to a decline in short (potentially child-related)
sickness spells. The coefficients of the other estimates are all comparable in magnitude
to those in Table 4 and at least significant at the 5 per cent level. Finally, in the sixth
column, we present results from placebo regressions for 2003 using the alternative control
group entering establishments with 0.5 to 4 FTE workers. Again, these results do not
provide any evidence of a significant placebo effect one year prior to the reform.
5.1.4 Selection Analysis
As shown above, our analyses point to a significant reform effect on transitions into long-
term sickness during the second year after establishment entry. However, the question
which mechanisms drive this result is still open. On the one hand, the established effect
might result from a “true” behavioural effect of newly hired individuals who adapted their
sickness behaviour to weaker dismissal protection regulations. On the other hand, the
change in sickness absence might also arise from a different selection of workers into es-
tablishments. As spelled out earlier, individuals with a high propensity of being long-term
sick might systematically select themselves into establishments with stricter employment
protection. On the other hand, due to weaker dismissal protection, employers in the af-
fected size class might be less cautious in their hiring behaviour after the reform and might
therefore be more likely to hire individuals with a higher propensity of becoming long-term
sick (Olsson, 2009). A less cautious hiring behaviour might also affect the propensity to
hire workers with less experience. These are often young workers who, at the same time,
also exhibit a lower propensity of becoming long-term sick. To address such potential
compositional effects, we next explore whether the reform changed the selection of work-
ers into establishments of different size classes. To do so, we first analyse whether the
reform affected the probability of hiring an individual who had at least one (long-term)
sickness period before entering the establishment.21 Second, we also analyse whether the
reform affected the propensity of hiring young workers below the age of 25. Given that the
21In doing so, we impose the assumption that individuals’ propensity of falling long-term sick is highly
correlated with their past sickness histories. Strictly speaking, we cannot fully rule out that individuals
anticipating a long-term sickness episode select themselves in establishments with stricter employment
regulations.
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propensity of risky hiring might vary across different employers, we perform both analyses
separately for shrinking/non-growing and growing establishments. The underlying notion
is that growing establishments may be more inclined to take on such risky hires (e.g., Coad
et al., 2014).22 The results of the difference-in-differences estimations are shown in Table
A.10 and Table A.11 in the Appendix. The estimated reform effects on the composition of
newly hired workers are throughout small and insignificant at any conventional level. As
to the age composition, growing establishments even exhibit a negative (albeit insignifi-
cant) coefficient. Given that the reform should especially cause growing employers to hire
more younger workers, this leads us to conclude that the results provide no evidence of
any compositional selection effects.
A further more dynamic selection issue could arise from the fact that the reform might
have affected newly hired individuals’ probability of still being employed (and, therefore,
of still being at risk of falling sick) during the second year after establishment entry. This
issue arises as, on the one hand, the reform may have induced treated individuals to leave
their employer earlier as compared in the pre-reform setting. On the other hand, weaker
employment protection regulations may also have caused establishments to faster dismiss
sick and therefore less productive employees among the treated individuals. To further
investigate this issue, we next explore whether the reform affected newly hired individuals’
probability of still being employed by their initial employer during the second year after
establishment entry. Table A.12 shows the results. The insignificant coefficient of the
interaction term provides no evidence for a reform effect. Along with our earlier results
pointing to no compositional effects in terms of health observables, this leads us to conclude
that our established reform effect from Table 4 is neither driven by a compositional nor
by a dynamic selection effect.
5.1.5 Heterogeneous Effects
As the effects could vary across different groups of workers, we next address heterogeneous
effects. To do so, we distinguish between gender and different skill groups. Due to sample
size limitations, we are unable to perform separate analyses for high-skilled employees,
though. Table 5 and Table 6 show the results for the different groups for the first and sec-
ond year after entering the establishment, respectively. For low-skilled men, the estimates
point to a significantly negative reform effect already in the first year. In the second year,
the reform appears to have a particularly negative effect on medium-skilled men. The
effect for this subgroup is larger in magnitude (2.5 percentage points) compared to the
baseline specification. Overall, the results suggest that in particular male workers respond
22To calculate the yearly growth rate of an establishment, we compare the number of FTE workers at
the beginning of a calender year (usually in January) with the number of FTE workers at the end of the
same calender year (usually in December).
20
to the change in dismissal protection.23 Note that this result is broadly consistent with
the evidence provided by Ziebarth (2013), suggesting that middle-aged workers and those
in the bottom part of the earnings distribution are found to react to a decline in sick pay.
As in Ziebarth (2013), a potential explanation for our result might relate to male workers’
male breadwinner status and a greater dependency of household incomes of male workers’
earnings.
Table 5: Heterogeneous Effects: Transition Into Sickness in the First Year After Entry
Female Male
Low-skilled Medium-skilled Low-skilled Medium-skilled
Post x Treat -0.015 0.011 -0.027** -0.004
(0.015) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)
Post -0.014 -0.017** -0.005 -0.013*
(0.014) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Treat -0.002 -0.012** 0.017** -0.001
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.005)
Individual Characteristics X X X X
Employment-Related Characteristics X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
Establishment Characteristics X X X X
Individual Employment and Sickness History X X X X
Constant 0.054* 0.088*** 0.051** 0.046***
(0.028) (0.017) (0.025) (0.012)
Observations 1,982 8,700 2,995 11,377
R2 0.035 0.033 0.041 0.031
Notes: The table shows results of a linear probability model estimating the probability of a transition into sickness
0 to 12 months after establishment entry; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The treatment (control) group consists of workers entering an establishment of
6-9 (12-20) FTE workers. All controls are measured at the date of entry into the establishment. For the definition
and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
5.2 Duration of Sickness
5.2.1 Descriptive Results
Next, we analyse whether the reform also affected the duration of sick leave. We restrict
our sample to those individuals who experienced at least one sickness spell after entering an
establishment of the relevant size class and calculate the cumulative duration of all sickness
spells during this employment spell.24 This results in a sample of 1,213 individuals. Figure
3 plots the distribution of the number of sickness days for the treatment and control group
before and after the reform. The figure illustrates that the distribution is right-skewed.
Even though the difference in the distributions between both groups is altered somewhat
after the reform, there appears to be no major visible post-reform change. When looking at
23Note, however, that the reform effects for low-skilled women are considerable in size, too, albeit not
significant at any conventional level.
24Taking into account that sickness is reported after six weeks in our data, we calculate the entire
number of absence days, by setting the start date of sickness 42 days before the start date of sickness
reported in the data.
21
Table 6: Heterogeneous Effects: Transition Into Sickness in the Second Year After Entry
Female Male
Low-skilled Medium-skilled Low-skilled Medium-skilled
Post x Treat -0.053 -0.009 0.003 -0.025**
(0.034) (0.011) (0.028) (0.012)
Post 0.027 -0.023** 0.002 -0.015
(0.024) (0.009) (0.027) (0.012)
Treat 0.024 0.002 0.012 0.013
(0.023) (0.008) (0.022) (0.010)
Individual Characteristics X X X X
Employment-Related Characteristics X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
Establishment Characteristics X X X X
Individual Employment and Sickness History X X X X
Constant 0.087 0.089*** 0.010 0.013
(0.074) (0.023) (0.041) (0.021)
Observations 500 3,356 586 3,245
R2 0.076 0.050 0.077 0.038
Notes: The table shows results of a linear probability model estimating the probability of a transition to sickness 12
to 24 months after establishment entry; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. The treatment (control) group consists of workers entering an establishment of
6-9 (12-20) FTE workers. All control variables are measured at the date of entry into the establishment. For the
definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3 in the Appendix.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
mean values (see Table 7), treated individuals’ sickness durations increase, whereas control
individuals’ sickness durations slightly decrease after the reform, but the difference is not
significant at conventional levels.
Figure 3: Distribution of Cumulative Sickness Days - Before and After Reform
Note. The treatment (control) group consists of workers working in establishments of 6-9 (12-20) FTE employees
who entered the establishment three years before or three years after the reform and who have at least one sickness
spell during their employment in this establishment. 19 (25) observations are censored as these persons are still ill
at the end of the observation period on 31 December 2003 (2006).
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
5.2.2 Regression Results
Because of the right skewed distribution, we use the log of the number of long-term
sickness days as our dependent variable in the multivariate DiD-analyses. The estimations
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Table 7: Average Sickness Duration in Days
Treated Control
Pre Post Diff Pre Post Diff DiD
All Sickness Spells 121.1 127.1 6.0 108.6 105.8 -2.9 8.9
Excluding Spells ≤ 10 days 138.8 146.2 7.3 126.2 123.7 -2.6 9.9
All Sickness Spells (ln) 4.3 4.4 0.0 4.3 4.3 0.0 -0.0
Excluding Spells ≤ 10 days (ln) 4.5 4.5 0.0 4.5 4.5 0.0 0.0
Notes: The table shows the mean values of (ln) long-term sickness duration in days. We sum up all long-term
illness days during the relevant employment period (cumulative duration). The differences are not significant at any
conventional level. The treatment (control) group consists of workers employed by establishments of 6-9 (12-20)
FTE employees who entered the establishment three years before or three years after the reform and who experience
at least one long-term sickness spell during their employment in this establishment.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
support the descriptive results (cf. Table A.13 in the Appendix). There are neither
differences across both groups nor time effects. The coefficients on the interaction terms
are negative, but not significant at any conventional level either. This result is robust to
several robustness checks (cf. Table A.14 in the Appendix). With regard to heterogeneous
effects, we do not find any effect when stratifying our sample by gender and skill groups.
Overall, these results indicate that weaker dismissal protection affects the incidence but
not the duration of long-term sickness periods.
5.3 Involuntary Unemployment after Sickness
In what follows, we examine whether the reform was associated with a higher risk of un-
employment after long-term sickness. More precisely, we estimate the association between
the reform’s policy change and the probability of becoming involuntarily unemployed af-
ter starting a long-term sickness episode. We restrict the sample to individuals having at
least one long-term sickness period after entering the new employment relationship.25 Our
dependent variable is an indicator variable for a transition into involuntary unemployment
after having started a long-term sickness spell. This dummy variable takes on the value
of unity if a transition into involuntary unemployment takes place and zero otherwise. As
we will estimate a time-discrete logit model, we measure this indicator for each quarter
after the start of a long-term sickness spell for those individuals who are still at risk, i.e.
those who have not yet left their initial employer. In doing so, we do not only consider
direct transitions from sickness into unemployment, but also allow individuals to return to
work after their long-term sickness period. To distinguish between voluntary and involun-
tary unemployment, we exploit the fact that unemployment benefits may be temporarily
suspended in case of voluntary quits (see also Table A.3 in the Appendix). To further
ensure that we indeed observe involuntary unemployment, we only count transitions into
25We only consider individuals whose sickness periods lasts no longer than 78 weeks in three years
(this exclusion affects only 9 observations). After 78 weeks of sickness, sick pay expires and the individual
becomes subject to unemployment benefits. In these cases, we can no longer distinguish between a true
transition into involuntary unemployment and unemployment that merely arises due to a substitution of
sick pay by unemployment benefits.
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unemployment spells lasting longer than four weeks as transitions into involuntary unem-
ployment.
5.3.1 Descriptive Results
Figure 4 shows non-parametric estimates of the Kaplan-Meier survival curves based on
involuntary unemployment exit hazards. Survival refers to the initial state of being em-
ployed at the same employer after having started a long-term sickness spell. The survival
curves are broken down by treatment and control individuals before and after the reform.
The figures show that by about three years after having started a long-term sickness
spell a fraction of about 35 per cent is still employed at the same employer both in the
treatment and control group prior to the reform. The control group appears to exhibit
slightly higher survival rates in the second half of the maximum observed duration of the
employment spell. After the reform, the fraction remaining employed has increased for
both groups, with the difference being somewhat larger for the control group.
Figure 4: Transition Into Unemployment After Sickness - Before and After Reform
Note. The figure shows the transitions into involuntary unemployment as a function of time in relevant employment.
The treatment (control) group consists of workers working in establishments of 6-9 (12-20) FTE employees who
entered the establishment three years before or three years after the reform and who have at least one sickness spell
during their employment in this establishment. Number of individuals: 1,161.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
5.3.2 Regression Results
Figure 5 shows the average marginal effects from estimating a multivariate time-discrete
logit model. The figure illustrates that up to quarter four the time effect on experienc-
ing a transition into involuntary unemployment is negative for both, treated and control
individuals, which supports the descriptive evidence from Figure 4. The magnitude and
significance of the time effects is displayed in row (2) of Table 8. The figures indicate that
in the third and fourth quarter, the negative effects are significantly different from zero.
The estimated differences in the marginal effects between treated and control individuals
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are displayed in the first row of Table 8. For the first and third quarter, the estimates are
negative and not significant at any conventional levels. For the remaining quarters, the
estimates exhibit their expected positive sign, but are again very imprecisely estimated.
Overall, these results fail to provide clear evidence that individuals who are employed in
establishments subject to weaker dismissal protection and who have fallen sick exhibit
significantly higher probabilities of becoming unemployed as compared to their control
counterparts.
Figure 5: Average Marginal Time Effects Transition Into Unemployment After Sickness
Note. The figure shows the average marginal time effects with 90% confidence intervals on the probability of
involuntary unemployment after sickness for the treatment and control group estimated in a time-discrete logit
model. The treatment (control) group consists of workers working in establishments of 6-9 (12-20) FTE employees
who entered the establishment three years before or three years after the reform and who have at least one
sickness spell during their employment in this establishment.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
We wish to note, though, that the estimates are selective in that they condition on
having experienced a long-term sickness spell. Given that the reform negatively affects the
incidence of long-term sickness, this may imply that treated individuals who experience
such a spell are, on average, unobservably different from those with a long-term sickness
episode prior to the reform. To the extent that individuals who - despite enjoying no
employment protection - fall (long-term) sick after the reform are those with particular
severe diseases, treated long-term sick individuals are likely to be negatively selected in
terms of health unobservables. On the other hand, as long as individuals who fall sick after
the reform are characterised by less moral hazard behaviour, these individuals are likely to
reflect a positive selection in terms of work attitude unobservables. Depending on which
kind of unobservable factor is more or less decisive for employers’ dismissal decisions, these
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Table 8: DiD Estimations Transition Into Unemployment After Sickness
Time After First
Day of Sickness 1 2 3 4 5
(Quarter)
Post x Treat -0.057 0.004 -0.058 0.006 0.103
(0.045) (0.058) (0.063) (0.083) (0.103)
Post -0.052 -0.009 -0.095*** -0.091** 0.016
(0.035) (0.037) (0.035) (0.042) (0.050)
Treat -0.007 0.019 0.022 0.059 0.061
(0.023) (0.030) (0.034) (0.043) (0.050)
Notes: The table shows the difference-in-differences estimations on the probability of involuntary unemployment
after sickness (average marginal effects) for each quarter after the first day of sickness (time-discrete logit model). The
specifications control for individual characteristics, employment-related characteristics, establishment characteristics
and the individual sickness and employment history. The effects are not significant at any conventional levels.
Number of observations: 2,489. Source: BASiD, own calculations.
selection mechanisms may either cause an upward or downward bias of our estimates on
the reform effects on unemployment transitions.
6 Mechanisms
What is still unanswered, is what type of sickness behaviour caused our established effect on
the incidence of long-term sickness episodes: Do our results reflect a decline in absenteeism
without being sick, i.e. did treated workers stay away from work more frequently without
being sick before the reform, when they were protected? Or do our findings reflect an
increase in presenteeism, as the reform induced more treated workers to attend work
despite being sick for fear of dismissal? In this context, it is important to differentiate
between short and long-term sickness behaviour as one would expect especially absenteeism
without being sick to occur more frequently at the lower bottom of the sickness duration
distribution. Ziebarth (2013) argues that short-term sickness absence, in general, is mostly
determined by flues and light illnesses, which clearly leave more scope for moral hazard,
especially when monitoring is weak. Moreover, the German institutional framework makes
long-term absenteeism costly, as statutory sick pay replaces only about 70 per cent of
foregone gross earnings. Apart from that, the German health insurances run a monitoring
system that restricts the misuse of statutory sick pay, making moral hazard even more
difficult and costly (see section 3.1 and de Jong et al., 2011). Ziebarth (2013), who analyses
cuts in long-term sick pay and subsequent behavioural reactions in Germany, finds that,
on average, the cuts did not affect long-term sickness behaviour. The author interprets
his results as evidence that individuals who were ill for more than six weeks were indeed
seriously ill.
Presenteeism may be prevalent in both short and long-term sick leaves as well. At
first glance, it may be easier to attend work when suffering from mild diseases, which
often do not last long, as compared to long-term and serious diseases. The most common
long-term diseases include musculoskeletal disorders, behavioural and mental disorders
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(Meyer et al., 2018). These diseases may make it difficult to come to work while being
sick, because they often require hospitalisation. However, the costs of absence rise with
the duration of illness, as a long-term sickness period is associated with a loss of income
and a perceived higher risk of dismissal. Presenteeism might therefore also occur in the
context of long-term sickness absence: Workers who are afraid of losing their jobs or of
experiencing a loss of income may try to avoid a long-term sickness absence period, for
example by returning to work without being completely cured, by postponing a necessary
surgery or by not participating in a medical rehabilitation measure.26
To further substantiate our findings, we additionally analyse German survey data
providing information on absenteeism and presenteeism. The BiBB/BAuA Employment
Survey of the Working Population on Qualification and Working Conditions in Germany
is a repeated cross-sectional survey of about 20,000 employees in Germany. The survey
is representative of the German Working Population and contains - among other things
- information on individuals’ health status and health behaviour (for more information
on the data set see Rohrbach-Schmidt and Hall, 2013). More precisely, the survey of
2012 contains questions on presenteeism (’In the last 12 months, did you ever go to work
although you should better have called in sick due to your state of health?’ If the answer
was yes, the respondents were further asked ’How many workdays was that all in all?’)
and absence (’Have you stayed sick at home in the last 12 months or have you called in
sick?’ If the answer was yes, the respondents were further asked ’How many workdays
was that all in all?’). Using this information, we generate dummy variables measuring the
incidence and length of presenteeism and absence periods.27 More precisely, we generate
a dummy variable being equal to one for an individual reporting more than 0, 5, 10 or 15
working days of presenteeism or absence per year, respectively.28 To distinguish between
employees with and without dismissal protection, we use information on establishment
size and introduce a dummy variable being equal to one for workers in establishments
with more than 20 to 49 employees and zero for workers in establishments with 5 to 9
employees.29 This yields a sample of 2,549 observations. The descriptive statistics show
26For example, Reichert et al. (2013), using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel, found that
an increase in subjective job insecurity substantially decreases the probability of participating in medical
rehabilitation.
27With the data at hand, we cannot explicitly measure absenteeism behaviour without being sick.
However, we can measure the incidence and length of actual absence controlling for individuals’ health
status.
28Due to a limited number of observations and an increasing measurement error in the higher distribution
of sickness durations, we cannot explicitly consider long-term presenteeism or absenteeism of more than
six weeks.
29Note that the BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey only collects information on how many individuals
are employed by an establishment, regardless of their working time. Trainees are also counted. This means
that establishment size cannot be exactly calculated according to the regulations of the PADA (see Section
3.2). Thus, the establishment size that is relevant for the applicability of the PADA is likely to be smaller
than the information on establishment size available by the BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey. To ensure
that we compare individuals with and without dismissal protection, we use employees working in a larger
establishments (establishments with more than 20 to 49 employees) as a comparison group.
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that there are some systematic differences in observables between the two groups (for the
descriptive statistics of the sample see Table A.18 in the Appendix). This highlights the
importance of including these variables as controls into our regressions. However, in terms
of subjective health status, individuals with and without dismissal protection do not seem
to differ significantly.
To analyse the association between dismissal protection and both, presenteeism and ab-
senteeism, we run probit regressions that control for observables, such as socio-demographic
information, working strains and the subjective health status (for a similar analysis see
Hirsch et al., 2017). Figure 6 shows the average marginal effects of dismissal protection
(as measured by establishment size) on the incidence of different durations of absence and
presenteeism. For absence, the marginal effect is initially positive and significant. More
precisely, individuals subject to dismissal protection have a 7.9 percentage points higher
probability of being absent at least once a year (for details and robustness checks, see also
Tables A.19 and A.20 in the Appendix). This association is highly significant. However,
for the incidence of longer absence periods, the marginal effect of dismissal protection gets
smaller (and eventually becomes insignificant). For presenteeism, the marginal effect of
dismissal protection is negative and increases in magnitude for the incidence of longer pe-
riods of presenteeism. The marginal effects and their differences across different durations
are, however, insignificant for all considered durations.
Figure 6: Marginal Effects of Dismissal Protection on Absence and Presenteeism
Note. The left figure shows the association between dismissal protection and absence of more than 0, 5, 10 or 15
working days per year (dummy variables). The differences between the marginal effects are not significant except
for the difference of the marginal effect of >10 days and >15 days. This difference is significant at the 1% level.
The right figure shows the association between dismissal protection and presenteeism of more than 0, 5, 10 or
15 working days per year (dummy variables). The differences between the marginal effects are not significant.
The presented effects are average marginal effects estimated by a probit model with 90% confidence intervals and
controlled for gender, age, household situation, qualification, health status, income, tenure, working hours, job
satisfaction, straining working conditions and branch of industry. For a detailed description of the sample and the
variables, see also Table A.16 and A.17 in the Appendix.
Source: BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2012, own calculations.
Overall, these findings provide no clear evidence of which of the two competing mech-
anisms - an increase in presenteeism or a decline in absenteeism - is more relevant for
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explaining our results. On the one hand, the duration-dependent pattern of the size of the
marginal effects suggests that the latter becomes larger for longer durations of presenteeism
and becomes smaller with longer durations of absenteeism. If one were to extrapolate this
pattern to long-term sickness spells of more than six weeks, this might support the view
that it is rather presenteeism that explains the established negative effect in our main
analysis. On the other hand, the marginal effect of establishment size on the incidence of
longer durations (>15 days) is of the same order of magnitude for both, absenteeism and
presenteeism, and is statistically not indistinguishable from zero for presenteeism. Thus,
the only conclusion that can be drawn from this complementary exercise is that neither
mechanism can be excluded as an explanation.
7 Summary and Conclusions
This paper empirically analyses the impact of a change in dismissal protection on the
incidence and duration of long-term sickness along with its consequences for involuntary
unemployment after long-term sickness episodes. We exploit a German reform in 2004 that
has shifted the threshold exempting small establishments from dismissal protection from
five to ten workers. We first show that loosening dismissal protection led to a decrease in
the incidence of long-term sickness among treated individuals, i.e. those who were hired
by establishments affected by the reform, relative to their control counterparts. Second,
we provide evidence that this negative effect stems from a behavioural change among
treated employees, rather than from a compositional effect that may arise from a different
selection of workers into establishments. This result is in line with the study by Olsson
(2009), which provides evidence of a negative effect of a weaker dismissal protection on
the sickness absence rate at the establishment level and which attributes this effect to
behavioural changes.
In quantifying the magnitude of the reform effect for the whole sample, we find that the
incidence of long-term sickness spells lasting longer than six weeks decreased by 1.3 per-
centage points among treated individuals during the second year after establishment entry.
Compared with a rather low mean transition rate into sickness during the second year, the
effect represents a decline by about 54 per cent. Overall, our results are consistent with
the PADA reform having had a large impact on the perceived job insecurity among treated
workers. The pronounced policy change for exempted establishments along with its impact
on perceived job security might explain the relatively large effect on sickness transitions
established by our study. The reform did neither affect the duration of long-term sickness
spells, nor was it associated with a higher risk of becoming involuntarily unemployed after
long-term sickness. In accordance with other studies, which fail to establish any effect of
dismissal protection on general worker flows (e.g. Bauer et al., 2007), our results suggest
that it appears to be less the establishments than the employees themselves who react to
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changes in dismissal protection regulations. Our findings also indicate that the regulations
of the PADA, which allow for dismissals in case of personal incapability, do not appear to
prevent establishments from dismissing individuals for reasons of severe and longer illness
episodes.
To identify the underlying mechanisms, we analyse the association between dismissal
protection and presenteeism and absence, respectively, using cross-sectional representative
German survey data. However, our complementary analysis provides no clear evidence of
whether the results reflect an increase in presenteeism or a decline in absenteeism. Taken
together, while our analyses reveal that dismissal protection affects long-term sickness
behaviour, the evidence on the behavioural mechanisms is less clear-cut. Given that
absenteeism and presenteeism impose high costs on both, employers and employees, this
highlights the need for future research on the underlying sources of long-term sickness
behaviour.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Description of Individual and Employment-Related Characteristics
Variable Definition/Categories
Nationality
Foreign: Dummy with value 1 for nationality that is not German, Reference:
German nationality. We correct missing and inconsistent data following the
suggested imputation procedure of Drews et al. (2007).
Educational Status
Low skilled : No degree or highschool degree (Reference category)
Medium skilled : Completed vocational training
High skilled : Technical college degree or university degree
Missing Education
Missing and inconsistent data on education from the Employment Statistics Reg-
ister are corrected according to the imputation procedure described in (Fitzen-
berger et al., 2006). This procedure relies, roughly speaking, on the assumption
that individuals cannot lose their educational degrees.
Earnings
Daily Wage: Daily wage is generated from fixed period pay referring to the
original duration of employment (Hochfellner et al., 2011).
Cumulative Earnings: Gross cumulative earnings are retrieved from credit points
to the German Pension Insurance. One credit point corresponds to the average
of yearly earnings of all gainfully employed workers in Germany. For each spell
observed in the data, earnings are thus obtained by multiplying the recorded
credit points per spell with the average of earnings as documented in the Ap-
pendix 1 to the German Social Act SGB VI. Credit points are reported up the
contribution limit of the German social security system.
Working Time
Working Fulltime: Dummy with value 1 for working fulltime, Reference: work-
ing part-time.
Occupation
Occupational Status: White-collar worker, Reference: Blue-collar worker
Occupational Activity : Classification of occupational activities according to the
3-digit code of the German classification of occupations 1988 (KldB 1988).
Groups: Agrar, Salary, Sale, Clerical, Service, Reference: Craftsman.
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Table A.2: Description Establishment Characteristics
Variable Definition/Categories
Location
West Germany : Dummy with value 1 for establishments located in West Ger-
many, Reference: East Germany. Berlin is counted as part of West Germany.
Industry
Industry dummies according to the classification of economic activities (3-
digit). Groups: Energy/Mining, Manufacturing, Construction, Wholesale, Traf-
fic/Communication, Banking/Insurance, Other Services, Public Administration,
Public Sector, Reference: Agrar/Fishery.
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Table A.3: Description of Labour Market States
Labour Market States
Employment: Employment spells include continuous periods of employment
(allowing for gaps of up to four weeks) subject to social security contributions
(excluding minor employment and periods of apprenticeship). Further, we en-
sure that a daily wage is reported that exceeds a certain threshold (7 Euro).
Unemployment Unemployment spells include periods of unemployment with
transfer receipt. A spell of unemployment in the Pension Register requires
individuals to be registered as unemployed and to obtain public transfers. The
latter include benefits such as unemployment insurance, and - prior to 2005 -
the means-tested social assistance and unemployment assistance benefits. After
2004, unemployment and social assistance were merged to one unified benefit,
also known as ’unemployment benefit II’ (ALG II). As the latter targets only
employable individuals, a spell involving the receipt of ALG II automatically
fulfills the requirements to be recorded as unemployed in the Pension Register.
Prior to 2005, spells with social assistance benefits fulfill these requirements
only if individuals were registered as unemployed. Otherwise these spells are
recorded as non-employment spells. As a consequence, the Pension Register
does not permit a consistent definition of un- and non-employment prior to and
after 2005.
Distinction between Un- and Non-Employment According to the proce-
dure proposed by Lee and Wilke (2009), involuntary unemployment is defined
as comprising all continuous periods of transfer receipt. Gaps between such
unemployment periods or gaps between transfer receipt and a new employment
spell may not exceed four weeks, otherwise these periods are considered as non-
employment spells (involving voluntary unemployment or an exit out of the
social security labour force). Similarly, gaps between periods of employment
and transfer receipt or job search are treated as involuntary unemployment as
long as the gap does not exceed six weeks, otherwise the gap is treated as non-
employment.
Illness spells Periods of illness recorded by the BASiD data generally refer to
spells of long-term illness. These spells refer to employees who have been absent
for more than six weeks.
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Table A.4: On the Definitions of Establishments
Definitions of Establishments
Legal Definition of “Establishment”: The PADA does not contain an own
definition of the term “establishment”. For this, the definition of § 1 BetrVG
applies. According to this definition, an organizational unit is considered an
establishment if the unit decides largely independently on working conditions
and organisational issues and carries out personnel matters such as hirings and
dismissals autonomously.
Definition of “Establishment” in the Administrative Data: An estab-
lishment is a regionally and economically delimited unit in which employees
work. An establishment may consist of one or more branch offices or workplaces
belonging to one company (Schmucker et al., 2018).
Figure A.1: Share of Individual Establishments
Note. The graph shows the share of establishments that are an independent company or an independent
organisation without any other places of business. The survey is representative of all establishments in Germany
(Ellguth et al., 2014).
Source: IAB Establishment Panel, 2001-2006
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Table A.5: Description of Group Assignment
Variables for Group Assignment
Entry in Establishment: First employment spell subject to social insurance
contributions in an establishment of relevant size between 1.1.2001 and 30.6.2003
or 1.1.2004 and 30.6.2006, respectively (for definition of employment see Table
A.3). Establishment in the shipping and aircraft transportation sector are ex-
cluded. We exclude individuals who were previously marginally employed or
employed as an apprentice by the same employer. We further exclude recalls up
to three years.
Establishment Size: Number of full-time equivalent workers according to the
PADA as described in section 3.2: Workers working full-time are counted as one
worker, workers in “mini part-time” (< 18 hours per week) or part-time without
further specification as well as marginally employed workers are weighted by a
factor of 0.5, workers in “midi part-time” (>= 18 hours per week) are weighted
by a factor of 0.75.a Further, we exclude apprentices. Based on the daily-
exact number of FTE workers, the annual average of the establishment size is
calculated to account for past and future developments of the workforce. We
assign workers entering in establishments with 6-9 (12-20) FTE workers to the
treatment (control) group. We ensure that the establishment remains in the
same size category during the time a worker is employed in this establishment.
aNote that the hours grid is not entirely identical to that of the PADA
which applies the threshold of 20 hours per week to distinguish between “mini
part-time” and “midi part-time” workers.
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Table A.6: Descriptive statistics III
Treatment Group
(1) Pre-Reform (2) Post-Reform
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean (2)-(1)
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.445 0.497 0.445 0.497 0.000
Age 31.923 9.813 33.008 9.909 1.085 ***
Age2 96.961 125.702 98.235 135.405 1.274
Foreign 0.261 0.439 0.259 0.438 -0.002
Qualification
Low-Skilled 0.192 0.394 0.156 0.363 -0.036 ***
Medium-Skilled 0.720 0.449 0.744 0.437 0.024 ***
High-Skilled 0.088 0.284 0.100 0.301 0.012 **
Cum. Earnings (in 10,000 EUR) 11.367 14.495 13.650 17.015 2.283 ***
Daily Wage 52.117 28.303 52.661 29.826 0.544
Working Fulltime 0.835 0.371 0.839 0.367 0.005
Occupational Status
Bluecollar 0.497 0.500 0.503 0.500 0.006
Whitecollar 0.323 0.468 0.326 0.469 0.003
Others 0.179 0.383 0.171 0.376 -0.008
Occupational Sector
Agrar 0.028 0.166 0.032 0.176 0.004
Craftsman 0.292 0.455 0.299 0.458 0.007
Salary 0.082 0.274 0.085 0.278 0.003
Sale 0.119 0.323 0.115 0.319 -0.003
Clerical 0.153 0.360 0.154 0.361 0.001
Service 0.327 0.469 0.315 0.464 -0.012
Establishment Characteristics
Location: West Germany 0.857 0.350 0.852 0.356 -0.006
Industry
Agrar/Fishery 0.030 0.170 0.033 0.179 0.003
Energy/Mining 0.001 0.034 0.003 0.053 0.002 **
Manufacturing 0.086 0.280 0.088 0.284 0.003
Construction 0.113 0.316 0.124 0.330 0.011 *
Wholesale 0.201 0.400 0.218 0.413 0.018 **
Traffic/Communication 0.073 0.260 0.064 0.245 -0.008 *
Banking/Insurance 0.010 0.101 0.012 0.111 0.002
Other Services 0.278 0.448 0.283 0.451 0.005
Public Administration 0.031 0.173 0.117 0.321 0.086 ***
Public Sector 0.014 0.119 0.056 0.231 0.042 ***
Individual Employment and Sickness History
Cum. Sickness Duration 1.869 5.649 1.931 5.431 0.061
Cum. Unemployment Duration 11.694 34.873 23.380 51.192 11.686 ***
Cum. Employment Duration 97.939 101.785 110.245 105.068 12.305 ***
Cum. Non-Employment Duration 34.044 54.511 34.292 52.265 0.249
# of Establishment Changes 4.953 5.147 5.677 5.561 0.723 ***
# of Sickness Spells 1.046 2.536 1.008 2.503 -0.037
# of Unemployment Spells 1.854 2.319 2.235 2.665 0.381 ***
# of Employment Spells 4.748 4.580 4.994 4.993 0.246 ***
# of Non-Employment Spells 2.168 2.597 2.150 2.602 -0.017
Number of individuals in baseline sample 5,970 5,310
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for relevant characteristics of the treatment group before and after
the reform. The treatment group consists of employees working in establishments of 6-9 FTE employees who entered
the establishment three years before and three years after the reform, respectively. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance of the difference in the mean between the treatment and control group at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
(t-test). For the definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. All durations are
measured in months. Source: BASiD, own calculations.
36
Table A.7: Descriptive statistics IV
Control Group
(1) Pre-Reform (2) Post-Reform
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean (2)-(1)
Individual Characteristics
Female 0.416 0.493 0.409 0.492 -0.007
Age 32.076 9.929 32.925 9.949 0.849 ***
Age2 99.030 127.012 98.993 134.836 -0.037
Foreign 0.271 0.444 0.248 0.432 -0.023 ***
Qualification
Low-Skilled 0.195 0.397 0.161 0.368 -0.034 ***
Medium-Skilled 0.705 0.456 0.716 0.451 0.011
High-Skilled 0.100 0.300 0.123 0.328 0.023 ***
Cum. Earnings (in 10,000 EUR) 11.998 15.776 14.526 18.192 2.528 ***
Employment-Related Characteristics
Daily Wage 54.772 29.259 56.276 32.444 1.504 ***
Working Fulltime 0.844 0.363 0.837 0.369 -0.007
Occupational Status
Bluecollar 0.500 0.500 0.515 0.500 0.015 *
Whitecollar 0.334 0.472 0.313 0.464 -0.021 ***
Others 0.166 0.372 0.172 0.377 0.006
Occupational Sector
Agrar 0.025 0.156 0.027 0.161 0.002
Craftsman 0.316 0.465 0.313 0.464 -0.003
Salary 0.091 0.287 0.102 0.302 0.011 **
Sale 0.099 0.299 0.096 0.294 -0.004
Clerical 0.169 0.375 0.166 0.372 -0.004
Service 0.300 0.458 0.297 0.457 -0.003
Establishment Characteristics
Location: West Germany 0.855 0.352 0.853 0.354 -0.001
Industry
Agrar/Fishery 0.023 0.150 0.026 0.159 0.003
Energy/Mining 0.002 0.039 0.004 0.064 0.003 ***
Manufacturing 0.116 0.320 0.114 0.317 -0.002
Construction 0.088 0.284 0.089 0.285 0.001
Wholesale 0.177 0.381 0.181 0.385 0.004
Traffic/Communication 0.074 0.262 0.079 0.269 0.005
Banking/Insurance 0.010 0.101 0.012 0.109 0.002
Other Services 0.311 0.463 0.328 0.470 0.017 **
Public Administration 0.036 0.186 0.117 0.322 0.081 ***
Public Sector 0.010 0.101 0.050 0.218 0.040 ***
Individual Employment and Sickness History
Cum. Sickness Duration 1.823 5.130 1.972 5.761 0.148 *
Cum. Unemployment Duration 12.178 36.981 22.348 50.833 10.171 ***
Cum. Employment Duration 99.945 107.715 109.666 106.368 9.720 ***
Cum. Non-Employment Duration 33.291 52.220 32.937 50.920 -0.353
# of Establishment Changes 5.094 5.416 5.868 6.596 0.773 ***
# of Sickness Spells 1.057 2.577 1.010 2.520 -0.047
# of Unemployment Spells 1.896 2.414 2.232 2.671 0.336 ***
# of Employment Spells 4.829 4.839 5.025 5.116 0.196 **
# of Non-Employment Spells 2.186 2.670 2.138 2.744 -0.049
Number of individuals in baseline sample 9,059 7,788
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for relevant characteristics of the control group before and after the
reform. The control group consists of employees working in establishments of 12-20 FTE employees who entered
the establishment three years before and three years after the reform, respectively. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance of the difference in the mean between the treatment and control group at the 10%, 5% and 1% level
(t-test). For the definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. All durations are
measured in months. Source: BASiD, own calculations.
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Table A.8: Robustness Estimations Transition Into Sickness in the First Year After Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post x Treat -0.000 -0.005 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 -0.004
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Post -0.005 -0.005* -0.013*** -0.002 -0.007** -0.007**
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Treat -0.001 0.006** -0.002 0.006** 0.006*** 0.008***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Individual Characteristics X X X X X X
Employment-Related Characteristics X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X
Establishment Characteristics X X X X X X
Individual Employment and Sickness HistoryX X X X X X
Constant 0.033*** 0.042*** 0.053*** 0.022*** 0.042*** 0.035***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 27,967 40,461 44,377 40,461 56,984 41,851
R2 0.020 0.024 0.027 0.017 0.022 0.025
Notes: The table shows results of a linear probability model estimating the probability of a transition into sickness
0 to 12 months after establishment entry; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1%
level. Standard errors are in parentheses. (1) excludes transitions into short sickness periods (less than 10 days)
as these periods may be due to sickness of a child. (2) uses workers in establishments with 0.5-4 FTE workers
as control group. These workers are not subject to dismissal protection before and after the reform. In (3), the
treatment (control) group consists of more than 5-10 (11-20) FTE workers. (4) excludes short sickness periods for
the alternative control group of 0.5-4 FTE workers. In (5), the treatment (control) group consists of more than 5-10
(0.5-<5) FTE workers. (6) shows the results of the 2003-placebo regression using the alternative control group of
0.5-4 FTE workers. For the definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
Table A.9: Robustness Estimations Transition Into Sickness in the Second Year After
Entry
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Post x Treat -0.011* -0.012** -0.013*** -0.010* -0.014*** -0.010
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006)
Post 0.021*** -0.007 -0.011** -0.002 -0.006 0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Treat 0.006 0.012*** 0.004 0.008** 0.010*** 0.010**
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005)
Individual Characteristics X X X X X X
Employment-Related Characteristics X X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X X
Establishment Characteristics X X X X X X
Individual Employment and Sickness HistoryX X X X X X
Constant -0.006 0.043*** 0.046*** 0.027*** 0.039*** 0.027***
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Observations 8,845 14,548 15,360 14,548 21,172 14,684
R2 0.022 0.024 0.028 0.022 0.024 0.021
Notes: The table shows results of linear probability models estimating the probability of a transition into sickness
13-24 months after establishment entry; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Standard errors are in parentheses. (1) excludes transitions into short sickness periods (less than 10 days) as these
periods may be due to sickness of a child. (2) uses workers in establishments with 0.5-4 FTE workers as control
group. In (3), the treatment (control) group consists of 5-10 (11-20) FTE workers. (4) excludes short sickness
periods for the alternative control group of 0.5-4 FTE workers. In (5), the treatment (control) group consists of
5-10 (0.5-<5) FTE workers. (6) shows the results of the 2003-placebo regression using the alternative control group
of 0.5-4 FTE workers. For the definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
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Table A.10: Selection Analysis I: Individual Characteristics at the Time of Entry
Individual Illness History
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All sickness periods Long sickness periods shrinking est. growing est.
Post x Treat -0.003 0.001 -0.006 -0.000
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) 0.012
Post -0.028*** -0.031*** -0.022* -0.034***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.013) (0.011)
Treat -0.002 -0.002 -0.004 -0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Individual Characteristics X X X X
Employment-Related CharacteristicsX X X X
Year Dummies X X X X
Establishment Characteristics X X X X
Individual Employment History X X X X
Constant 0.212*** 0.168*** 0.210*** 0.210***
(0.015) (0.014) (0.022) (0.020)
Observations 28,127 28,127 11,813 16,314
R2 0.367 0.352 0.370 0.368
Notes: The table shows results of a linear probability model estimating the probability of having had at least one
sickness period at the time of establishment entry; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and
1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. (1) includes all sickness periods, (2) excludes short sickness periods
(less than 10 days) as these periods may be due to sickness of a child, (3) and (4) include all sickness periods; in (3)
we confine our sample to establishments with a yearly growth rate smaller than or equal to zero, in (4) we analyse
the effects for establishments with a yearly growth rate greater than zero. For the definition and construction of
the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. In contrast to the other analyses, we do not include the individual
illness history as control variable.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
Table A.11: Selection Analysis II: Individual Characteristics at the Time of Entry
Age (<25 Years)
(1) (2) (3)
All estab. shrinking estab. growing estab.
Post x Treat -0.002 0.007 -0.010
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008)
Post 0.002 -0.000 0.004
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)
Treat 0.003 -0.006 0.011*
(0.004) (0.006) (0.006)
Individual Characteristics X X X
Employment-Related Characteristics X X X
Year Dummies X X X
Establishment Characteristics X X X
Individual Employment and Sickness History X X X
Constant 0.112*** 0.116*** 0.107***
(0.009) (0.013) (0.012)
Observations 28,127 11,813 16,314
R2 0.678 0.674 0.683
Notes: The table shows results of a linear probability model estimating the probability of being younger than 25
years at the time of entry; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. (1) includes all
establishments, in (3) we confine our sample to establishments with a yearly growth rate smaller than or equal to
zero, in (4) we analyse the effects for establishments with a yearly growth rate greater than zero. Standard errors
are in parentheses. For the definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
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Table A.12: Selection Analysis III: Probability of Retention One Year After Entry
(1)
Post x Treat -0.006
(0.013)
Post 0.015
(0.011)
Treat -0.019**
(0.009)
Individual Characteristics X
Employment-Related Characteristics X
Year Dummies X
Establishment Characteristics X
Individual Employment and Sickness History X
Constant 0.281***
(0.020)
Observations 21,218
R2 0.123
Notes: The table shows results of a linear probability model estimating the probability of being in the establishment
one year after entry; *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are
in parentheses. We exclude individuals entering an establishment less than one year before 2004 and before 2006,
respectively. For the definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. We restrict the
sample to persons entering the establishment at least one year before the observation period ends.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
Table A.13: Regression Results Duration of Sickness
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Placebo
Post x Treat -0.022 -0.023 -0.032 -0.010 -0.031
(0.118) (0.114) (0.114) (0.113) (0.100)
Post 0.034 0.051 0.088 0.080 0.006
(0.069) (0.090) (0.093) (0.093) (0.085)
Treat 0.088 0.097 0.098 0.087 0.073
(0.074) (0.071) (0.071) (0.070) (0.064)
Individual Characteristics - X X X X
Employment-Related Characteristics - X X X X
Year Dummies - X X X X
Establishment Characteristics - - X X X
Individual Employment and Sickness History - - - X X
Constant 4.253*** 4.206*** 4.320*** 4.137*** 4.109***
(0.047) (0.071) (0.122) (0.151) (0.138)
Observations 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,213 1,273
R2 0.002 0.085 0.096 0.114 0.102
Notes: The table shows results of a linear regression estimating the logarithmic number of sickness days; *, **
and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. The
treatment (control) group consists of workers working in establishments of 6-9 (12-20) FTE employees who entered
the establishment three years before or three years after the reform and who have at least one sickness spell during
their employment in this establishment. All controls are measured at the date of entry into the establishment.
For the definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3. The placebo regression
hypothetically assumes the dismissal protection reform to take place in 2003.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
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Table A.14: Robustness Estimations Duration of Sickness
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Post x Treat -0.024 -0.047 0.091 0.027 -0.053
(0.121) (0.128) (0.256) (0.111) (0.081
Post 0.084 0.057 -0.169 0.057 0.034
(0.098) (0.107) (0.188) (0.083) (0.070)
Treat 0.074 0.091 0.126 -0.101 0.058
(0.075) (0.080) (0.158) (0.071) (0.051)
Individual Characteristics X X X X X
Employment-Related Characteristics X X X X X
Year Dummies X X X X X
Establishment Characteristics X X X X X
Individual Employment and Sickness History X X X X X
Constant 4.337*** 4.234*** 4.003*** 4.636*** 4.175***
(0.168) (0.179) (0.341) (0.155) (0.113)
Observations 952 871 192 1,228 1,869
R2 0.127 0.139 0.209 0.102 0.078
Notes: The table shows results of a linear regression estimating the log number of sickness days; *, ** and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. The treatment (control)
group consists of workers working in establishments of 6-9 (12-20) FTE employees who entered the establishment
three years before or three years after the reform and who have at least one sickness spell during their employment in
this establishment. (1) excludes transitions into short sickness periods (less than 10 days). (2) restricts the sample to
sickness transitions in the first year after entry, (3) in the second year after entry. (4) uses workers in establishments
with 0.5-4 FTE workers as control group. In (5), the treatment (control) group consists of workers in establishments
with 5-10 (11-20) FTE workers. All controls are measured at the date of entry into the establishment. For the
definition and construction of the variables see also Tables A.1, A.2 and A.3.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
Table A.15: Robustness Estimations Transition Into Unemployment After Sickness
n
Time After First
Day of Sickness 1 2 3 4 5
(Quarter)
(1) 2,489
Post x Treat -0.064 0.022 -0.059 0.012 0.110
(0.046) (0.060) (0.064) (0.084) (0.105)
(2) 3,275
Post x Treat -0.038 0.010 -0.071 -0.039 0.099
(0.044) (0.056) (0.063) (0.082) (0.094)
(3) 4,088
Post x Treat -0.029 0.004 -0.013 0.019 -0.039
(0.036) (0.043) (0.048) (0.058) (0.063)
(4) 1,912
Post x Treat -0.048 -0.019 -0.020 0.027 0.092
(0.051) (0.069) (0.075) (0.097) (0.104)
(5) 551
Post x Treat 0.032 -0.005 -0.005
(0.070) (0.096) (0.118)
Notes: The table shows robustness checks for the difference-in-differences estimations on the probability of in-
voluntary unemployment after sickness (average marginal effects) for each quarter after the first day of sickness
(time-discrete logit model). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. All estima-
tions are controlled for individual characteristics, employment-related characteristics, establishment characteristics,
the individual sickness and employment history, and include year dummies. (1) takes also unemployment spells
within <30 days after job loss into account; (2) uses workers in establishments with 0.5-4 FTE workers as control
group; in (3), the treatment (control) group consists of 5-10 (0.5-<5) FTE workers; (4) restricts the sample to
workers having had at least one long sickness spell (>10 days) during their relevant employment. In (5), we restrict
the sample to individuals being employed one year (at least 355 days) before entering the establishment of interest.
Source: BASiD, own calculations.
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Table A.16: BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey: Description of Data and Sample
BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2012: The BiBB/BAuA Employment
Survey of the Working Population on Qualification and Working Conditions in
Germany 2012 is a representative survey among employees in Germany. The
participants are at least 15 years old and work at least ten hours per week. The
survey realised a response rate of 44.3 per cent yielding a representative cross-
sectional sample of 20,036 individuals from the active labour force population.
The survey data provides information on both the incidence and extent of sick-
ness absence and presenteeism, subjective health status, tenure, stressful work-
ing conditions, qualification and professional field as well as socio-demographic
variables (for more details see Rohrbach-Schmidt and Hall (2013)).
Sample: We restrict our estimation to employees working in establishments
from five to nine and 20 to 49 workers. We exclude civil servants as they enjoy
special employment protection. We omit individuals working more than 60
hours a week as well as individuals older than 65 years. After these exclusions,
we obtain a sample of 2,549 observations with complete data on all relevant
covariates.
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Table A.17: BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey: Description of Variables
Variable Definition (Survey Question)/Categories
Dismissal Protection
Dummy variable with value 0 for individuals in firms with 5 to 9 employees (not
protected) and value 1 for individuals working in establishments with 20 to 49
employees (protected).
Presenteeism
In the last 12 months, did you ever go to work although you should better have
called in sick due to your state of health?
If the answer is “yes”: How many workdays was that all in all?
Dummy variables with value 1 for (1) at least one workday of presenteeism, (2)
at least five workdays of presenteeism, (3) at least ten workdays of presenteeism
and (4) at least 15 days of presenteeism.
Sickness Absence
Did you stay home sick or have you called in sick in the last 12 months?
If the answer is “yes”: How many workdays was that all in all?
Dummy variables with value 1 for (1) at least one workday of absence, (2) at
least five workdays of absence, (3) at least ten workdays of absence and (4) at
least 15 days of absence.
Education
What is your highest general school leaving certificate? Low skilled : No degree
or highschool degree (Reference category)
Medium skilled : Completed vocational or professional training
High skilled : Technical college degree or university degree
Subjective Health Status
How would you describe your general state of health? Answer categories: excel-
lent, very good, good, not so good, bad ; Reference category: good.
Income What is your gross monthly income? ; measured in 100 EUR.
Working Hours
What are the weekly working hours in your occupational activity according to the
agreement with your employer, excluding overtime? ; working hours >=61 are
excluded.
Job Satisfaction
And now, as an overall summary: How satisfied are you with your entire occu-
pational activity? Answer categories: very satisfied, satisfied, less satisfied, not
satisfied.; Dummy Variable with value 0 for “less satisfied” and “not satisfied”
and value 1 for “very satisfied” and “satisfied”.
# of Working Strains
Following Kroll (2011), we cluster working strains into three categories with
seven items for each category.
Physical Strains: E. g. exposure to cold, heat, moisture, humidity, or draughts,
handling of hazardous substances
Psychical Strains: E. g. working under strong pressure of time or performance,
repetitive tasks, work is disturbed or interrupted
Social Strains: E. g. emotionally straining situations, perceived importance of
work, being part of a community
If the answer to a certain strain is positive, the individuals were further asked:
Is that stressful for you?. Following Hirsch et al. (2017), we sum up those strains
by which individuals feel stressed.
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Table A.18: BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey: Descriptive Statistics
(1) Without DP (2) With DP
Mean S. D. Mean S. D. Mean (2)-(1)
Sickness Absence (Incidence) 0.465 0.499 0.558 0.497 0.094 ***
Presenteeism (Incidence) 0.605 0.489 0.605 0.489 0.000
Female 0.676 0.468 0.569 0.495 -0.106 ***
Age 44.580 10.870 45.574 10.765 0.993 **
Partner in Household (Dummy) 0.616 0.487 0.623 0.485 0.007
Child(ren) in Household (Dummy) 0.351 0.478 0.314 0.464 -0.037 *
Education
Low-Skilled 0.150 0.357 0.233 0.423 0.083 ***
Medium-Skilled 0.687 0.464 0.606 0.489 -0.081 ***
High-Skilled 0.163 0.370 0.161 0.367 -0.002
Health status
Excellent 0.090 0.286 0.075 0.263 -0.015
Very good 0.227 0.419 0.214 0.410 -0.013
Good 0.537 0.499 0.545 0.498 0.007
Not so good 0.127 0.333 0.141 0.348 0.014
Bad 0.019 0.138 0.025 0.157 0.006
Income in 100 EUR 19.902 21.142 24.948 22.741 5.046 ***
Tenure (in yrs) 10.668 9.447 12.945 10.679 2.277 ***
Working hours 31.619 10.049 33.786 8.992 2.167 ***
Occupational Status: Whitecollar 0.853 0.355 0.810 0.392 -0.042 ***
Job Satisfaction 0.932 0.252 0.909 0.288 -0.023 **
# of Straining Working Conditions
# of physical strains 0.871 1.574 1.032 1.831 0.161 **
# of psychical strains 1.286 1.777 1.527 1.857 0.242 ***
# of social strains 0.230 0.643 0.294 0.698 0.064 **
Branch of industry
Industry sector 0.049 0.215 0.128 0.335 0.080 ***
Craft sector 0.211 0.408 0.135 0.342 -0.076 ***
Commerce sector 0.173 0.379 0.154 0.361 -0.020
Other services 0.279 0.449 0.234 0.423 -0.045 **
Another sector 0.083 0.276 0.062 0.241 -0.021 **
Public service sector 0.205 0.404 0.287 0.453 0.082 ***
Observations 882 1,667
Notes: The table reports descriptive statistics for relevant characteristics of individuals with and without dismissal
protection (DP) (according to establishment size). *, ** and *** denote statistical significance of the difference in
the mean between the treatment and control group at the 10%, 5% and 1% level (t-test). For the definition and
construction of the variables see also Table A.17. Source: BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2012, own calculations.
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Table A.19: Determinants of Absence and Presenteeism (Marginal Effects)
Sickness Absence Presenteeism
Dismissal protection 0.079*** -0.012
(0.020) (0.019)
Female 0.040* 0.094***
(0.023) (0.021)
Age -0.006*** -0.006***
(0.001) (0.001)
Partner in household (Dummy) 0.009 0.017
(0.020) (0.019)
Child(ren) in household (Dummy) -0.015 -0.009
(0.022) (0.021)
Education, Reference: Low-Skilled
Medium-Skilled 0.010 0.039
(0.028) (0.026)
High-Skilled -0.018 0.020
(0.035) (0.032)
Health status, Reference: Good
Excellent -0.192*** -0.222***
(0.036) (0.032)
Very good -0.107*** -0.167***
(0.024) (0.021)
Not so good 0.156*** 0.203***
(0.030) (0.031)
Bad 0.267*** 0.233***
(0.075) (0.083)
Income in EUR 0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000)
Tenure -0.001 0.000
(0.001) (0.001)
Working hours 0.003*** 0.002*
(0.001) (0.001)
Occupational Status: Whitecollar (Dummy) 0.028 0.018
(0.028) (0.027)
Job satisfaction -0.103** -0.067
(0.040) (0.042)
Number of straining working conditions
# of Physical strains 0.008 0.038***
(0.007) (0.007)
# of Psychical strains -0.001 0.036***
(0.006) (0.006)
# of Social strains 0.023 0.046***
(0.016) (0.017)
Branch of industry, Reference: Public service sector
Industry sector -0.090** 0.006
(0.037) (0.034)
Craft sector -0.091*** 0.025
(0.033) (0.031)
Commerce sector -0.139*** -0.016
(0.031) (0.029)
Other services -0.083*** -0.021
(0.027) (0.025)
Another sector -0.043 -0.034
(0.041) (0.038)
Observations 2,549 2,549
Notes: The table shows the average marginal effects from probit regressions. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. For a detailed description of the variables, see Table A.17.
Source: BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2012, own calculations.
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Table A.20: Robustness Checks Absence and Presenteeism (Marginal Effects)
Absence
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dismissal protection 0.086*** 0.074*** 0.100*** 0.021 0.052**
(0.021) (0.018) (0.021) (0.015) (0.022)
Controls X X X X X
Observations 2,535 3,006 2,130 4,254 2,160
Presenteeism
(6) (7) (8) (9)
Dismissal protection -0.018 0.003 -0.028 0.010
(0.019) (0.017) (0.020) (0.015)
Controls X X X X
Observations 2,538 3,006 2,130 4,254
Notes: The table shows the average marginal effects from probit regressions. *, ** and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. We control for subjective health status, number of physical, psychical
and social working strains, working hours, qualification, gender, age, branch of industry, partner in househould,
child(ren) in household, income and job satisfaction. For a detailed description of the variables, see Table A.17. In
(1) and (6), we include job dummies as control variables; in the main specification, the variables are not included due
to multicollinearity. In (2) and (7), we use a different group assignment: Dismissal protection equals to zero (one) for
individuals working in establishments with 1-9 (20-49) employees. In (3) and (8), dismissal protection equals to zero
(one) for individuals working in establishments with 5-9 (10-19) employees. In (4) and (9), we conduct a placebo
test by comparing individuals in establishments with 1-19 employees (Dismissal Protection=0) with individuals in
establishments with 20-49 employees (Dismissal Protection=1). (5) uses the BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey of
2006 as data base.
Source: BiBB/BAuA Employment Survey 2012, 2006, own calculations.
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